Abstract. Active cyber defense is one important defensive method for combating cyber attacks. Unlike traditional defensive methods such as firewall-based filtering and anti-malware tools, active cyber defense is based on spreading "white" or "benign" worms to combat against the attackers' malwares (i.e., malicious worms) that also spread over the network. In this paper, we initiate the study of optimal active cyber defense in the setting of strategic attackers and/or strategic defenders. Specifically, we investigate infinite-time horizon optimal control and fast optimal control for strategic defenders (who want to minimize their cost) against non-strategic attackers (who do not consider the issue of cost). We also investigate the Nash equilibria for strategic defenders and attackers. We discuss the cyber security meanings/implications of the theoretic results. Our study brings interesting open problems for future research.
Introduction
The importance of cyber security is well recognized now. However, our understanding of cyber security is still at its infant stage. In general, the attackers are constantly escalating their attack power and sophistication, while the defenders largely lag behind. To be specific, we mention the following asymmetry between cyber attack and cyber defense: The effect of malware-like attacks is automatically amplified by the network connectivity, while the defense effect is not. This phenomenon had been implied by many previous results (e.g., [28, 9, 6, 26, 34] ), but was not explicitly pointed out until very recently [35] . The asymmetry is fundamentally caused by that the defense is reactive, including intrusion detection systems, firewalls and anti-malware tools. The asymmetry can be eliminated by the idea of active cyber defense [35] , where the defender also aims to take advantage of the network connectivity. The concept of active cyber defense is not completely new because researchers have proposed for years the idea of using the defender's "white" or "benign" worms to combat against the attackers' malwares initially occupies a certain large portion of the network, it will not escalate its active defense (or attack) -a sort of diminishing returns.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related prior work. Section 3 describes the basic active cyber defense model under the homogeneous assumption. Section 4 investigates optimal control for strategic defenders against non-strategic attackers. Section 5 studies Nash equilibria for strategic defenders and attackers. Section 6 concludes the paper with some open problems. Lengthy proofs are deferred to the Appendix. The main notations used in the paper are listed below: α B , α R defender B's defense power α B and attacker R's attack power α R i B (t), i R (t) portions of the nodes occupied respectively by the defender and the attacker at time t, where i B (t) + i R (t) = 1 π B , π B (t) π B is control variable and π B (t) is control function π B solution in the infinite-time horizon optimal control case π * B , π * * B solutions in the case of fast optimal control with linear and quadratic cost functions, respectively z discount rate k B normalization ratio between the defender's detection cost and recovery cost λ normalization ratio between the unit of time and the defender's active defense cost k R normalization ratio between the attacker's maintenance cost and penetration cost
Related Work
Our investigation is built on recent studies in mathematical computer malware models. These models originated in the mathematical biological epidemic models introduced in the 1920's [19, 12] , which were first adapted to study the spreading of computer virus in the 1990's [10, 11] . All these models made the homogeneous assumption that each individual (e.g., computer) in the population has equally infection effect on the other individuals in the population, and the assumption that the infected individuals recover because of reactive defense (e.g., anti-malware tools). In the past decade, there were many studies that aim to eliminate the aforementioned homogeneous assumption, by explicitly incorporating the heterogeneous network structures [28, 9, 6, 26, 34, 32] . The mathematical tools used for these studies are Dynamical Systems in nature. These studies demonstrated that the attack effect of malware spreading against reactive defense is automatically amplified by the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, which represents the underlying complex network structure. This is the attack-defense asymmetry phenomenon mentioned above. The attack-defense asymmetry phenomenon motivated the study of mathematical models of active cyber defense [35] , which is a relatively new sub-field in cyber security [18, 24, 31] as previous explorations were mainly geared toward legal and policy issues [5, 1, 29, 23, 16, 18, 13, 30] . One real-life incident of the flavor of active cyber defense is that the Welchia worm attempted to "kick out" another kind of worms (e.g., the Blaster worm) [23, 20] . In the first mathematical characterization of active cyber defense [35] , neither the attacker nor the defender is strategic (i.e., they do not consider the issue of cost), albeit the model accommodates the underlying complex network structure. In the present paper, we move a step toward ultimately understanding optimal active cyber defense, where the attacker and/or the defender are/is strategic (i.e., they want to minimize their cost). Finally, we note that automatic patching [27] is not active cyber defense because automatic patching aims to prevent attacks, whereas active cyber defense aims to identify and possibly clean up infected computers.
There have been many studies (e.g., [33, 21, 8, 4, 14, 22, 15, 25] ) on applying Control Theory and Game Theory to understand various issues related to computer malware spreading. Our study is somewhat inspired by the botnet-defense model investigated in [4] . All the studies mentioned above only considered reactive defense; whereas we investigate how to optimize active cyber defense. For general information about the applications of Control Theory and Game Theory to cyber security, we refer to [2, 17] and the references therein.
The Basic Active Cyber Defense Model
Consider a population of nodes, which can abstract computers in a cyber system. At any point in time, a node is either occupied by defender B (i.e., the node is secure), or occupied by attacker R (i.e., the node is compromised). Denote by i B (t) the portion of nodes that are occupied by the defender at time t, and by i R (t) the portion of nodes that are occupied by the attacker at time t, where i B (t)+i R (t) = 1 for any t ≥ 0. In the interaction between cyber attack and active cyber defense, the defender and the attacker can "grab" nodes from each other in the same fashion. Let α B abstract defender B's power in grabbing attackeroccupied nodes using active cyber defense, and α R abstract attacker R's power in compromising defender-occupied nodes using malware-like cyber attacks. Under the homogeneous assumption that (i) each secure node has the same power in "grabbing" the attacker-occupied nodes and (ii) each compromised node has the same power in compromising the defender-occupied nodes, we obtain the following Dynamical System model:
where i B (t) + i R (t) = 1, i B (t) ≥ 0, and i R (t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Due to the symmetry, we only need to consider
If neither the attacker nor the defender is strategic (i.e., they do not consider the issue of cost), the dynamics of system (1) can be characterized as follows.
-If the attacker is more powerful than the defender, namely α R > α B , the attacker will occupy the entire network in the fashion of the Logistic equation (i.e., when i R is small, i R increases slowly; when i R is around a threshold value, i R increases exponentially; when i R is large, i R increases slowly). -If the defender is more powerful than the attacker, namely α B > α R , the defender will occupy the network in the same fashion as in the above case. -If the attacker and the defender are equally powerful, namely α R = α B , the system state is in equilibrium. In other words, i B (t) = i B (0) and
The above model accommodates non-strategic attackers and non-strategic defenders, and is the starting point for our study of optimal active cyber defense.
Optimal Control for Strategic Defender Against
Non-Strategic Attacker
Infinite-time Horizon Optimal Control
In this setting, the non-strategic attacker R maintains a fixed degree of attack power α R , while the defender B is strategic. That is, the strategic defender aims to minimize its cost (specified below) by adjusting its defense power α B via
while obeying the dynamics of (1), where π B ∈ [0, 1] is the control variable and α B ∈ [b, a] is the defender's defense power with 1 ≥ a > b ≥ 0. The cost to the defender consists of two parts.
-The recovery cost for recovering the compromised nodes to secure states (e.g., re-installing the operating systems and updating the backup data files, interference with the computers' routine functions). We represent this cost by f B (i B (t)) for some real-valued function f B (·). We assume f ′ B (·) < 0 because the more nodes the defender occupies, the lower the cost for the defender to recover the compromised nodes.
-The detection cost for detecting (or recognizing) compromised nodes via active cyber defense, which partly depends on the attack's evasiveness. We represent this cost by k B ·π B (·), where k B is the normalization ratio between the detection cost and the recovery cost, and π B (·) is the control function that specifies the adjustable degree of active cyber defense power. This is plausible because using more powerful active defense mechanisms (e.g., more sophisticated/advanced "white" worms) causes a higher cost but allows the defender to fight against the attacks more effectively.
The above definition of cost accommodates at least the following family of active cyber defense: The defender uses "white" worms to detect the compromised nodes, then possibly manually recovers the compromised nodes. This is perhaps the most probable scenario because for example, the attacker's malware may have corrupted or deleted some data files in the compromised computers. Note that the detection cost highlights the difference between (i) active-cyber-defense based detection, where the defender's detection tools (i.e., "white" worms) do not reside on the compromised computers, and (ii) reactive-cyber-defense based detection such as the current generation of anti-virus software, where the detection tools do not spread over the network.
Assuming that the attacker maintains a fixed degree of attack power α R , the defender's optimization goal is to minimize the total cost with a constant discount rate z over an infinite-time horizon, namely
where f
, and the attacker's fixed degree of attack power α R is treated as a constant. Now the optimization problem reduces to identifying the optimal defense strategyπ B . To solve the minimization problem, we use Pontryagin's Minimum Principle to find the Hamiltonian associated to (2): (3) where p is the adjoint equation
The optimal strategyπ B is obtained by minimizing the Hamiltonian
is linear in π B , the optimal control strategyπ B takes the following bang-bang control form:
where
In the singular form ∂HB ∂πB = 0 and for a period of time, we have
Further differentiating ∂HB ∂πB with respect to t, we have
Then we need to study the roots of F B (·) = 0. Before presenting the results, we discuss the ideas behind them. In this paper, we focus on case f B (i B ) = 1 − i B , which can be easily extended to any linear recovery-cost function. If k B z < 1 4 (a − b), then F B (i B ) = 0 has two roots:
with 0 < i 1 < i 2 < 1. As illustrated in Figure 1 , this implies
Then, the optimal strategyπ B of the singular form can be obtained by solvinġ i B | iB =i1 or iB =i2 = 0.
Theorem 1. Suppose the non-strategic attacker maintains a fixed degree of attack power
The optimal control strategy for defender B is:
Proof of Theorem 1 is deferred to Appendix A. In practice, i 1 and i 2 can be obtained numerically. Theorem 1 (also as illustrated in Figure 1) shows that the outcome of the infinite-time horizon optimal control, namely lim t→∞ i B (t), depends on the initial system state i B (0) as follows:
, the defender should use the least powerful/costly active defense mechanisms (i.e., α B = b) becauseπ B = 0. Moreover, the outcome of the optimal defense is that the defender will occupy i 2 portion of the network, namely lim t→∞ i B (t) = i 2 . This suggests a sort of diminishing returns in active cyber defense: It is more cost-effective to pursue "good enough" security (i.e., lim t→∞ i B (t) = i 2 < 1) than to pursue "perfect" security (i.e., lim t→∞ i B (t) = 1) even if it is possible. -If 0 = i B (0) < i 1 , the defender should use the least powerful/costly active defense mechanisms (i.e., α B = b) becauseπ B = 0. Moreover, the outcome of the optimal defense is that the defender should give up (using active cyber defense as the only defense methods), as the attacker will occupy the entire network, namely lim t→∞ i B (t) = 0. In other words, the defender should resort to other defense methods as well (e.g., proactive defense).
, the defender should use the most powerful/costly active defense mechanisms (i.e., α B = a) becauseπ B = 1. Moreover, the outcome of the optimal defense is that the defender will occupy i 2 portion of the network, namely lim t→∞ i B (t) = i 2 . This also suggests a sort of diminishing returns mentioned above. 
The optimal control strategy isπ B = 0.
The cyber security implications of Theorem 2 are the following. In the case k B z = 1 4 (a − b), the outcome under the optimal control depends on the initial system state as follows:
-If 1 > i B (0) > i 1 , the defender should use the least powerful/costly active cyber defense mechanisms becauseπ B = 0. The outcome is that the defender will occupy i 1 portion of the network, namely lim t→∞ i B (t) = i 1 . -If 0 = i B (0) < i 1 , the defender should use the least powerful/costly active cyber defense mechanisms becauseπ B = 0. The outcome is that the defender will give up using active cyber defense alone, as the attacker will occupy the entire the network, namely lim t→∞ i B (t) = 0. In other words, the defender should resort to other defense methods as well (e.g., proactive defense). In the case k B z > 1/4(a−b), the defender should use the least powerful/costly active cyber defense mechanisms becauseπ B = 0. The outcome is that lim t→∞ i B (t) = 0, meaning that the defender should give up using active cyber defense alone and resort to other defense methods as well (e.g., proactive defense).
By considering Theorems 1 and 2 together, we draw some deeper insights. Specifically, for a given z, different k B 's suggest different optimal active defense strategies. More specifically, if k B > 1 4z (a − b), meaning that the cost of optimal control is dominating, then defender B should use the least powerful/costly active cyber defense mechanisms becauseπ B (t) = 0 for all t and the outcome is lim t→∞ i B = 0. In other words, the defender should give up using active cyber defense alone, and resort to other kinds of defense methods as well (e.g., proactive defense). If k B < 1 4z (a − b), meaning that the cost of control is not dominating, the defender should enforce optimal control according to the initial state i B (0). In particular, if k B = 0, meaning that the special case that the cost of control is not counted, defender B should use the most powerful/costly active defense mechanisms asπ B (t) = 1 for all t, and the outcome is that lim t→∞ i B = 1, namely that the defender will occupy the entire network.
Fast Optimal Control for Strategic Defenders against Non-Strategic Attackers
Now we consider fast optimal control for strategic defenders against non-strategic attackers, as motivated by the following question: Suppose the attacker maintains a fixed degree of attack power α R and the defender initially occupies i B (0) = i 0 < i e portions of the nodes, how can the defender use optimal control to occupy the desired i e portions of the nodes as soon as possible? More precisely, the optimization is to minimize the sum of active defense cost and time (after appropriate normalization), which can be described by the following functional:
where h(·) is the cost function with respect to the control function π B (·). We consider two scenarios of cost functions: linear and quadratic. In both scenarios, we need to identify defender B's optimal strategy with respect to the dynamics of (1) and a given objective i e > i 0 for some hitting time T that is to be identified.
Scenario I: Fast optimal control with linear cost functions. In this scenario, we have h(π B ) = π B . The optimization task is to minimize the active defense cost plus the time T :
subject to
where λ > 0 is the normalization ratio between the unit of time and the active defense cost T 0 π B (t)dt, and i 0 < i e . That is, λ, i 0 and i e are given, but T is free. Note that the active defense cost 
Proof of Theorem 3 is deferred to Appendix B. The cyber security implication of Theorem 3 is the following. In order to achieve fast optimal control, the defender should use the most powerful/costly active cyber defense mechanisms, namely π B (t) = 1 for t < T * , until the system state becomes i B (T * ) = i e at time T * . After time T * , if the defender continues enforcing π B (t) = 1 for t > T * , then lim t→∞ i B (t) = 1, meaning that the defender will occupy the entire network.
Scenario II: Fast optimal control with quadratic cost functions. In this scenario, we have h(π B ) = π 2 B . The optimization task is to minimize the following sum of active defense cost and time, which differs from the linear cost (9) in that the cost function π B is replaced with cost function π
where λ > 0 is the ratio between the unit of time and the active defense cost T 0 π 2 B (t)dt (including both recovery cost and detection cost), and i 0 < i e . That is, λ, i 0 and i e are given, but T is free. (11) is
Theorem 4. The solution to the fast optimal control problem
Proof of Theorem 4 is deferred to Appendix C. It cyber security implication is: Unlike in the setting of linear cost function (Theorem 3), the defender should not necessarily enforce the most powerful/costly active cyber defense mechanisms as π * * B is not always equal to 1. If the defender continues enforcing π B (t) = 1 for t > T * * after the system reaches state i B (T * * ) = i e at time T * * , the defender will occupy the entire network, namely lim t→∞ i B (t) = 1.
Nash Equilibria for Strategic Attacker and Defender
Now we ask the question: What if the attacker is also strategic? Analogous to the way of modeling strategic defenders, we assume α R ∈ [b, a]. (It is straightforward to extend the current setting α B , α R ∈ [b, a] to the setting α B ∈ [b B , a B ] and α R ∈ [b R , a R ].) A strategic attacker can adjust its attack power
That is, the attacker can launch more sophisticated attacks (i.e., greater π R leading to greater α R ), which however incurs higher cost (e.g., the investment for obtaining more powerful attack tools).
Since both the defender and the attacker are strategic, we naturally consider a game-theoretic model. Specifically, the defender B's optimization task is
and the attacker R's optimization task is
< 0 (as in the infinite-time horizon optimal control case investigated above), f ′ R (·) > 0 because f R (i B (t)) represents the maintenance cost to the attacker, k R is the normalization ratio between the attacker's maintenance cost and penetration cost (which depends on the capability of the attack tools), and k R · π R (·) is the penetration cost. Note that f ′ R (·) > 0 is relevant because the attacker may need to conduct some costly (or risky) activities after "grabbing" a node from the defender (e.g., downloading attack payloads from some remote server, while this downloading operation may increase the chance that the compromised node is detected by active defense). Since f ′ R (·) > 0 implies df R /di R < 0, the attacker's optimization task for π R is in parallel to the optimization for π B . The Hamiltonians associated to defender B's and attacker R's optimization problems are:
The adjoint equation is
Then, the Nash equilibria under various scenarios are listed in Table 1 , where
Proof of Theorem 5 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and omitted due to space limitation. Its cyber security implication is: The outcome of playing the Nash equilibrium strategies also depends on the initial system state and the relationship between k B and k R . As illustrated in Figure 2 , if k B < k R with k R z < 1 4 (a−b), meaning that the attacker is more concerned with its control cost (e.g., reluctant to use/expose its advanced attack tools such as zero-day exploits) than the defender, then F B (i B ) = 0 has two roots i 1 , i 2 and F R (i B ) = 0 has two roots i 3 , i 4 . Then, we have i 1 < i 3 < i 4 < i 2 (the only possibility under the given conditions). Therefore, the outcomes under the Nash equilibrium strategies are summarized as follows:
π B =π R = 0 are the Nash equilibrium strategies.
which implies that
i B (t) strictly increases until i B = i 3 . When i B (t) = i 3 at some point in time t = t 1 ,π B =π R = 1 implies i B (t) = i 3 for t > t 1 . Table 1 . Nash equilibrium strategies for defender and attacker in various cases.
kB kR Roots of FB (iB ) = 0 Roots of FR(iB ) = 0 Nash equilibria
No real-valued rootsπB = 0,πR = 0 Fig. 2 . Illustration of the roots of FB(iB) = 0 with fB(iB) = 1 − iB, and the roots of FR(iB) = 0 with fR(iB) = iB, where a − b = 1, kBz = 1/8 and kRz = 1/6. The x-axis represents iB and the y-axis represents y(iB) = iB(1 − iB)(a − b). Arrows indicate the directions the outcome under the Nash equilibrium heads for. Black-colored bars indicate that the trajectory under the Nash equilibrium stays static.
i B (t) strictly increases until i B = i 2 . When i B (t) = i 2 at some point in time t = t 2 ,π B =π R = 1 implies i B (t) = i 3 for t > t 2 .
meaning that the attacker is extremely concerned with its control cost (e.g., not willing to easily use/expose its advanced attack tools such as zero-day exploits) but the defender is not, then it always holds thatπ R = 0 because F R (i B ) = 0 has no root but F B (i B ) = 0 has two roots i 1 < i 2 . From Table 1 , we see that lim t→∞ i B (t) = 1 always holds, namely that the attacker gives up using its advanced attack tools.
If
, meaning that both the defender and the attacker are extremely concerned with their control costs (i.e., neither the defender wants to easily use/expose its advanced active defense tools, nor the attacker wants to use/expose its advanced attack tools such as zero-day exploits), then it always holds thatπ B =π R = 0 because F B (i B ) = 0 and F R (i B ) = 0 have no real-valued roots. As a result, i B (t) = i B (0) for any t > 0.
The scenarios that one or both F B (i B ) = 0 and F R (i B ) = 0 have one root can be regarded as degenerated cases of the above. Moreover, the cases of k B > k R (i.e., the defender is more concerned about its control cost, such as not willing to easily use/expose its advanced active defense tools), the outcomes under the Nash equilibria can be derived analogously.
Conclusion
We have investigated how to optimize active cyber defense, by presenting optimal control solutions for strategic defenders against non-strategic attackers, and identifying Nash equilibrium strategies for strategic defenders and attackers. We have discussed the cyber security implications of the theoretic results. This paper brings interesting problems for future research. First, it is interesting to extend the models to accommodate nonlinear f B (·) and f R (·). Second, the models are geared toward active cyber defense. A comprehensive defense solution, as hinted in our analysis, should require the optimal integration of reactive, active, and proactive cyber defense. Therefore, we need to extend the models to accommodate reactive defense and proactive cyber defense. Moreover, it is interesting to investigate how to extend the models to accommodate moving target defense, which has not be systematically evaluated yet [7] . Third, how to extend the models to accommodate the underlying network structures? 
Consider the singular form i B (t) = i * for a period of time. We obtain thati B | iB =i * = 0 and thuŝ
B Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. To solve the minimization problem, we formulate the current value Hamiltonian associated with (9):
The adjoint equation isq = −
where T * denotes the optimal hitting time that i B (T * ) = i e , π * B (·) denotes the optimal feedback control, and i * B (·) denotes the corresponding trajectory. The optimal control π * B is obtained by minimizing Hamiltonian H F (i B , π B , q). Since H F (i B , π B , q) is linear in π B , the optimal control π * B takes the following bang-bang form: . This completes the proof. ⊓ ⊔
C Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. To solve the optimization problem, we formulate the current value Hamiltonian associated with (11):
H F (i B , π B , q) = λπ 
where T * * denotes the optimal final time, π * * B (·) denotes the optimal feedback control, i B (·) denotes the corresponding trajectory, and i B (T * * ) = i e . Let D = q(a − b)i B (T * * )(1 − i B (T * * )). From (25) ⊓ ⊔
